In Illinois, no specific notification to the mortgagor is needed before commencing a mortgage foreclosure suit connecting to commercial residential or commercial property and a lot of the guidelines meant to help keep property owners in their homes do not use. But what about the odd scenario where an otherwise commercial residential or commercial property is utilized by the mortgagor as a main home? In a cautionary tale for foreclosing loan providers, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, in Banco Popular North America v. Gizynski, 2015 IL App (1st) 142871, just recently held that where a specific mortgagor makes use of a commercial residential or commercial property as his or her residence, the lender is needed to supply the mortgagor with the notices required under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) governing residential foreclosures. Thus, even if the mortgaged property was never intended to be made use of as a residence or has industrial qualities, a loan provider will not be saved from the IMFL's residential notice requirements.

In Gizynski, while the mortgagor listed the address of the mortgaged residential or commercial property in the Gizynski case as his residence, the residential or commercial property was consisted of an overall of 4 structures, 3 of which were utilized for strictly commercial functions. Given this, Banco Popular The United States and Canada submitted its mortgage foreclosure complaint as an industrial foreclosure and without supplying the mortgagor any of the notices needed by the IMFL for domestic foreclosures. The bank consequently submitted a motion to appoint a receiver for the mortgaged residential or commercial property, which determined the structure that the mortgagor resided in as having a storage/warehouse area in the back, with 2 floorings developed as workplaces with kitchen area locations that were presently occupied as homes.

Gizynski filed a motion to dismiss the bank's complaint, claiming that the mortgaged residential or commercial property fulfilled the statutory definition of "property property" consisted of in section 15-1219 of the IMFL, and therefore, no foreclosure action could be instituted without the bank initially sending by mail the notice required by the IMFL. The IMFL's definition of "residential property" includes structures with 6 or fewer "single household residence systems," where one of the systems is occupied by the mortgagor as his principal home. In support of his argument, Gizynski sent an overall of nine affidavits, consisting of four from other property occupants of the building and entrepreneur who rented workplace in the building. In addition, Gizynski likewise sent files from the tax assessor's workplace showing that his property owner's exemption had been applied to the subject residential or commercial property.

The high court found Gizynski's arguments unpersuasive no less than five times when it (1) gave the bank's motion to select a receiver, discovering that the residential or commercial property was business